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Labor Law-Secondary Consumer Picketing-Picketing
to Discourage Purchase of the Struck Product from a
Neutral Is Not Unlawful, Although the Struck Product
Comprises the Great Bulk of the Neutral's Business
Retail Store Employees, Local 1001 v. NLRB*
I. Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that the primary purpose of Congress in adding
subsection (ii) to section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)1
was to limit a labor union's right to exert pressure on a neutral secondary
employer. 2 The subsection was deemed necessary to plug a loophole in the
Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 which allowed unions to appeal to
customers of a secondary employer to cease patronizing that employer.3 Since
its enactment, however, the courts have had difficulty in formulating a uniform
policy with regard to the amendment's enforcement. In particular, section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 4 dealing with consumer product picketing, has provided a steady
stream of litigation due to the inability of courts to agree on the extent of that
section's proscriptions. Confusing matters even further is the fact that the
Supreme Court's sole pronouncement on such activity involved a unique fac-
tual situation which precluded the Court from dealing with many of the most
controversial aspects of product picketing. 5
No. 76-2015 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1979).
1 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976). The statute pro-
vides, in relevant part, that:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . .
(4) (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in indu. try affect-
ing commerce, where in either case an object thereof is ...
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any producer, processor, manufacturer,
or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any
other employer to recognize, or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been
certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section
159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be con-
strued to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary picketing
. . . Provided further, That nothing contained in this paragraph (4) shall be con-
strued to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public . . . , that a product or products are produced by an
employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute as long as
such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by
any person other than the primary employer. ., to refuse to pick up, deliver, or
transport any goods . . . at the establishment of the employer engaged in such
distribution.
2 2 N.L.R.B., Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (1959)
(Senator McClellan). "The amendment ... covers pressure in the form of dissuading customers from deal-
ing with secondary employers." Id.
3 Id.
4 See note 1 supra.
5 NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964), rev'g, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C.
Cir. 1962), rev'g, 132 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961). Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent references will be to
the Supreme Court's decision, This case was the subject of numerous notes, among them: Peaceful Consumer
Picketing at Secondary Site Not Prohibited by Section 8(bX4) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 33 FORDHAM L.
REV. 112 (1964); A New Loophole in Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 682
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In NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), the Supreme
Court held that not all secondary picketing was prohibited by section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B).6 Rather, the Court held consumer picketing to "coerce" the
neutral employer in violation of 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) only if the appeal requested con-
sumers to boycott completely the secondary employer distributing the struck
product. An appeal requesting only that consumers not purchase the struck
product was deemed lawful as "merely following the struck product.'' 7
Unavoidably imposing itself upon the Court's deliberations was the first
amendment question of whether a ban on peaceful consumer picketing was an
encroachment on the union's right to free speech. Although the majority opin-
ion avoided dealing directly with that issue by construing narrowly the pro-
scriptions of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), both the concurring and dissenting opinions
focused on the first amendment issue as one which must be confronted in any
picketing controversy.
The decision in Tree Fruits has been the starting point for most of the
subsequent cases involving consumer picketing. In a number of them, the
secondary activity has been held unlawful.8 In these cases the courts have not
explicitly challenged the Tree Fruits rationale. They have, however, limited its
scope by their willingness to distinguish Tree Fruits on factual grounds. The ex-
ception has been the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has
emerged as the lone court to adhere strictly to a broad, literal interpretation of
Tree Fruits. And in Retail Store Employees, Local 1001 v. NLRB (Safeco), 9 the
District of Columbia court reaffirmed its unwillingness to depart from the
Supreme Court's ruling. The court allowed the consumer picketing involved
despite the fact that, if successful, it would almost certainly have resulted in
putting the secondary employer out of business. This decision is in conflict with
and fails to take account of the competing interests of the neutral employer.
The court's decision raises many of the difficult problems which the unique
facts of Tree Fruits allowed the Supreme Court to avoid. In so doing, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals has given the Supreme Court proper occasion,
on the fifteenth anniversary of Tree Fruits, to clarify its holding in that case.
II. Statement of the Facts
The controversy in the present case arose in 1974 when five land title com-
panies, 10 all Washington corporations, became involved in a labor dispute be-
tween Safeco Title Insurance Company and Local 1001 of the Retail Store
(1965); Consumer Picketing Under the Landrwn-G-frin Amendments to the Taf-Hartly Act, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
238 (1965); Picketing and Publicity Under Section 8(b)(4) of the LMRA, 73 YALE LJ. 1265 (1963-64).
6 377 U.S. at 63.
7 Id. at 72.
8 See, e.g., K&K Construction v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 1228 (3d Cir. 1979); Hoffman v. Cement Masons
Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); American Bread Co. v. NLRB,
411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969); Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
9 No. 76-2015 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1979), rehearing en bancrev'g, Lab. Cases (CCH) 10,993 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 5, 1978), enforcing, 226 N.L.R.B. 754 (1976).
10 Land Title Company of Snohomish County, Land Title Company of Kitsap County, Land Title
Company of Cowlitz County, Land Title Company of Clark County, and Land Title Company of Pierce
County.
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Employees Union, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO (the
Union). All five land title companies provide real estate title searches, issue ti-
tle insurance, and perform escrow services. All of their title insurance is under-
written by Safeco and this insurance constitutes the great bulk of their
business.I' Safeco is also a substantial stockholder in each company 12 and each
company has at least one Safeco officer on its Board of Directors.13 Safeco,
however, exercises no control over the personnel policies of the five land title
companies and has no employees who are also employed by any of the five.
None of the land title companies' employees have any union affiliation.
Safeco, a California corporation, engages in title insurance underwriting
and related activities. The Union was the certified collective bargaining
representative of certain Safeco employees. A contract negotiation came to an
impasse, whereupon the Union employees went on strike and began picketing
Safeco's office in Seattle.
On several occasions striking employees, "with the knowledge and
authority of the union,'1 4 patrolled the customer entrances of one or more of
the land title companies. At such times the employees carried signs reading
"SAFECO NONUNION DOES NOT EMPLOY MEMBERS OF OR
HAVE CONTRACT WITH RETAIL STORE EMPLOYEES, LOCAL
1001. . .. ,"" The employees also distributed handbills to customers requesting
that Safeco policyholders support the strike by cancelling their insurance. The
striking Safeco employees were careful to avoid encouraging work stoppages by
any land title company employees and made no attempt to interfere with any
deliveries to the land title companies.
One of the land title companies filed a complaint with the NLRB charging
the Union with carrying on an unlawful secondary boycott.' 6 Soon thereafter,
Safeco intervened, charging the Union with an unfair labor practice. The par-
ties waived a hearing before an administrative, judge and submitted the case
directly to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) on a stipula-
tion of facts. 17 The Board then ruled against the Union upon a finding that the
land title companies were neutrals to the dispute and thereby entitled to protec-
tion from coercive secondary activity. 1 8 The Board ordered the Union to desist
in its picketing of the land title companies.' 9
The Union petitioned the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to review
and set aside the Board's order,20 and the Board applied for enforcement. A
three-judge panel affirmed the Board's order by a two-to-one vote. The Union
then requested and received a rehearing en banc. The full court, in a five-to-four
11 The range is from 90-95%. No. 76-2015 at 3 n.6.
12 Safeco's stock ownership is 53% in one land title company and it ranges from 12% to 38% in the
other four. Id. at 4 n.7.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 3.
15 Id.
16 Land Title Company of Pierce County.
17 No. 76-2015 at 4 n.10.
18 226 N.L.R.B. 754 (1976). The vote was 3-2, with Members Fanning and Jenkins dissenting.
19 Id.
20 Lab. Cases (CCH) 10,993 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 5, 1978). The Union was allowed to petition the D.C.
Circuit pursuant to 5 10(l) of the NLRA, which allows any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board to
petition for review in any circuit in which the unfair labor practice occurred or in which the person resides,
or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
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decision, overruled the three-judge panel, granted the Union's petition to set
aside the Board's order and denied the Board's application for enforcement.2 1
III. The Statute
The extent to which pressure can be exerted by a labor organization
against a neutral secondary employer is controlled by section 8(b)(4) of the
NLRA. 22 When the union's object is to force the neutral employer to cease
dealing with the primary employer, clause (i) of 8(b)(4) prohibits the union
from inducing any individual employed by the neutral employer to refuse to
handle goods or to strike against the neutral employer, while clause (ii)
prevents the union from threatening or coercing the neutral employer
directly.23 Notwithstanding the broad language of section 8(b)(4), a proviso to
this section specifically exempts from its coverage primary strikes and primary
picketing.2 4 In addition, a second proviso, the so-called "publicity proviso,"
allows informational activities, other than picketing, for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public that products produced by the primary employer
are being distributed by another employer (the neutral), so long as such activi-
ty does not induce work stoppages on the premises of the neutral.2 5
The "threatening or coercing" language of clause (ii) was thought to sug-
gest that picketing a secondary employer was per se an unfair labor practice. 26
This impression, however, was refuted by the Supreme Court's decision in Tree
Fruits.
IV. Tree Fruits
Tree Fruits involved a situation in which the secondary employer was a
Safeway grocery store and the product being picketed was Washington ap-
ples-a product comprising only an insubstantial portion of Safeway's
business. The NLRB found the object of the union's activity was forcing the
neutral Safeway store to cease selling or handling the struck product. 27 The
Board determined that this was in direct violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the
NLRA, and ordered the union to cease picketing. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals reversed the Board, and determined that the picketing must
be allowed.2 8 The court based its holding on the fact that since Safeway was
unlikely to suffer any substantial economic impact, the primary purpose of the
picketing was the exercise of constitutionally protected free speech. "Thus it
may well be that the picketing in this case is closer to the core notion of con-
stitutionally protected free speech than the picketing the Supreme Court has
21 No. 76-2015 at 30.
22 See notes 1-2 supra.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 See Aaron, The Labor-Management and Reporting Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1086, 1114 (1960); Cox,
The Landrum-GrifOin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REv. 257, 271 (1959). But see
Previant, The New Hot-Cargo and Secondary Boycott Sections: A Critical Analysis, 48 GEo. L.J. 346, 353 (1959).
27 132 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961).
28 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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held may be banned.' '29 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and upheld the
picketing, basing its decision upon reasoning substantially different from that
used by the court of appeals.
A. The Supreme Court Majority
The Court held that not all consumer picketing constituted the "isolated
evil" that Congress intended to prohibit by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 3° Only those
appeals which requested consumers to cease all dealings with the secondary
employer were proscribed. A request that consumers not purchase the struck
product was more closely allied to the primary dispute and was, in effect, no
more than merely following the struck product:
When consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers not to
buy the struck product, the union's appeal is closely confined to the primary
dispute. The site of the appeal is expanded to include the premises of the
secondary employer, but if the appeal succeeds, the secondary employer's
purchases from the struck firms are decreased only because the public has
diminished its purchases of the struck product. On the other hand, when con-
sumer picketing is employed to persuade customers not to trade at all with the
secondary employer, the latter stops buying the struck product, not because of
a falling demand, but in response to pressure designed to inflict injury on his
business generally. In such case, the union does more than merely follow the
struck product; it creates a separate dispute with the secondary employer.3 1
The Court determined that the union's right peacefully to publicize its dispute
with the primary employer outweighed any possible losses encountered by the
secondary employer being picketed. As a result of this finding, the Court held
that the court of appeals had erred in basing its decision upon the issue of
whether the picketing had caused or was likely to cause a substantial economic
impact on the secondary employer:
We disagree therefore with the Court of Appeals that the test of "to
threaten, coerce, or restrain" for the purpose of this case is whether Safeway
suffered or was likely to suffer economic loss. A violation of 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
would not be established, merely because respondent's picketing was effective
to reduce Safeway's sales of Washington State apples, even if this led or might
lead Safeway to drop the item as a poor seller.3 2
It is the inability of subsequent courts to interpret uniformly the extent of
this statement that is at the heart of the present controversy. More immediate-
ly, that statement was the source of disagreement between the majority of the
Court and Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart.
29 Id. at 316.
30 377 U.S. at 63 (1964).
31 Id. at 72.
32 Id.
[February 1980]
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B. Justice Black's Concurring Opinion
Contrary to the majority position, Justice Black agreed with the NLRB
and Justices Harlan and Stewart in reading the legislative intent of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to prohibit all secondary picketing. In this opinion, however, that
intent is at odds with the constitutional right of free speech.
Because of the language of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor
Relations Act and the legislative history set out in the opinions of the Court
and of my Brother Harlan, I feel impelled to hold that Congress, in passing this
section of the Act, intended to forbid the striking employees of one business to
picket the premises of a neutral business where the purpose of the picketing is
to persuade customers of the neutral business not to buy goods supplied by the
struck employer. Construed in this way, as I agree with Brother Harlan that it
must be, I believe, contrary to his view, that the section abridges freedom of
speech and press in violation of the First Amendment. 3
Justice Black supported his contention by separating the patrolling aspect from
the communicative aspect of picketing. He maintained that while there may be
times when the damage likely to result to the public from patrolling would war-
rant restrictions, that was not the case here. InJustice Black's interpretation,
both the Board andJustice Harlan sought to restrict the picketing, not because
of its effect on the public, but because of what the pickets said:
In short, we have neither a case in which picketing is banned because the
pickets are asking others to do something unlawful nor a case in which all
picketing is, for reasons of public order, banned. Instead, we have a case in
which picketing, otherwise lawful, is banned only when the picketers express
particular views. The result is an abridgement of the freedom of these
picketers to tell a part of the public their side of a labor controversy, a subject
the free discussion of which is protected by the First Amendment.34
Justice Black concluded by refuting Justice Harlan's argument that the
Court can legally proscribe the picketing because the union has other means of
communicating its view of the dispute to the public.3 5 "First Amendment
freedoms can no more validly be taken away by degrees than by one fell
Swoop.' '36
C. Justice Harlan's Dissent
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, first found fault with the ma-
jority's determination that Congress, in enacting section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), "ha[d]
not, with the 'requisite clarity,' evinced a purpose to prohibit such picketing
when directed only at the products of the primary employer. "7 Justice Harlan
could not discern in either section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) or its legislative history "any
33 377 U.S. at 76 (Black, J., concurring).
34 Id. at 79.
35 Id. at 79-80.
36 Id. at 80.
37 377 U.S. at ,81 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
COMMENTS
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basis for the Court's subtle narrowing" of the statute.3 8 "Nothing in the
statute lends support to the fine distinction which the Court draws between
general and limited product picketing.'' 39 He went on to note that "The
distinction drawn by the majority becomes even more tenuous if the picketed
retailer depends largely or entirely on sales of the struck product.' '40 By way of
example, Justice Harlan described a situation in which an independent gas sta-
tion owner sells gas purchased from a struck gasoline company, and is then
picketed by the gasoline company's employees. Harlan's argument was that
the station owner is no less "threatened or coerced" by signs reading "Don't
buy X gas" than by signs reading "Don't patronize this gas station." ' 41
Justice Harlan then addressed the first amendment issue deemed
dispositive by Justice Black. Reasoning that picketing is "inseparably
something more than and different from simple communication, ' 42 Justice
Harlan stated that,
Congress has given careful and continued consideration to the problems
of labor-management relations and its attempts to effect an accommodation
between the right of unions to publicize their position and the social desirabili-
ty of limiting a form of communication likely to have effects caused by
something apart from the message communicated, are entitled to great
deference. The decision of Congress to prohibit secondary consumer picketing
during labor disputes is, I believe, not inconsistent with the protections of the
First Amendment, particularly when, as here, other methods of communica-
tion are left open. 43
V. Subsequent Case Law
A. Distinguishing Tree Fruits
In a number of cases since 1964, the courts have distinguished Tree Fruits
in finding consumer picketing unlawful. 44 These cases have typically involved
two different factual situations. The first situation in which consumer picketing
is disallowed is when the union requests a total boycott of the secondary
employer. The second occurs when the product picketed has become so merged
with other products distributed by the secondary employer as to make it im-
possible for consumers to boycott the struck product without boycotting vir-
tually the entire line of products distributed by the secondary employer.
The first situation is exemplified in Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v.
NLRB.45 Employees on strike against a newspaper picketed a number of
restaurants which advertised in that paper, asking people not to patronize those
establishments. Although the actual placards read similarly to those used in
Tree Fruits, it was obvious to the court that the real meaning of the placards was
38 Id. at 82.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 83.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 93.
43 Id.
44 See note 8 supra.
45 401 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
[February 1980]
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to dissuade customers from doing any business with the restaurants, especially
since handbills passed out at the time of the picketing said precisely that. 46 The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in holding that such blatant in-
terference with the neutral was unlawful, stated,
Here, where picketing means a total boycott, one interest must plainly yield,
either the Union's desire to maximize pressure on the primary employer (the
newspaper) by cutting off its markets or the neutral's desire to avoid a boycott
of his entire business. In the 1959 amendments, Congress chose protection of
the neutral from this sort of disruption as the interest more deserving of pro-
tection. Indeed, the Supreme Court so stated in Tree Fruits when it character-
ized as one of the "isolated evils" barred by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), "picketing
which persuades the customers of a secondary employer to stop all trading
with him." 4 7
The second situation, typified in American Bread v. NLRB, 48 involves the
"merged product" theory. In American Bread, customers of restaurants were
asked not to purchase products produced by the American Bread Company.
The Sixth Circuit held that because customers would have had to pass up any
meal that included bread in order to boycott the struck product, the union's re-
quest unavoidably spread the boycott to products other than those produced by
American Bread.4 9 Therefore, the struck product had become inextricably
merged with the general business of the secondary employer. The picketing, in
effect, requested a total boycott; the court found that request to be an unlawful
secondary activity.
B. Dow Chemical
Ten years after Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Tree Fruits, his ex-
ample of a picketed gasoline station became a reality when that exact situation
was presented in Local 14055, United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB (Dow
Chemical).5 0 In that case Dow Chemical manufactured gasoline which it sold to
independent gas station owners under the product name "Bay" gas. Striking
Dow Chemical workers picketed the stations with signs reading "Don't Buy
Bay Gas."
The issue in Dow Chemical was first dealt with by the NLRB. By a three-to-
two vote, the Board ordered the union to cease picketing the gas stations.5 1 The
Board held that since the gasoline was a much larger component of the station's
income than were the apples of Safeway's income, Tree Fruits was not ap-
plicable. They found the union's picketing "reasonably calculated to induce
customers not to patronize the neutral parties . . . at all. 52
46 Id. at 954 n.4.
47 Id. at 956.
48 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969).
49 Id. at 154.
50 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), re'g, 211 N.L.R.B. 649 (1974), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807
(1976), complaint dismissed on remand, 229 N.L.R.B. 302 (1977). Like Tree Fruits, Dow Chemical was the topic of
a number of law review comments. See, e.g., 10 GA. L. REv. 871 (1975-76); Developing a Standardfor Secondary
Consumer Picketing, 26 LAB. L.J. 585 (1975); Consumer Picketing-Struck Product as Major Source of Revenue, 30
RUTGERS L. REV. 176 (1976-77); 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 579 (1976-77).
51 211 N.L.R.B. 649 (1974).
52 Id. at 651.
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A strong dissent, however, argued forcefully that the Supreme Court had
made it clear that consumer picketing aimed only at the struck product was not
proscribed by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The dissent noted in support of its conten-
tion the Supreme Court's unequivocal rejection of the Board's reasoning as
originally raised by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Tree Fruits.53
The District of Columbia Circuit granted the union's petition to set aside
the Board's order, and denied the Board's application for enforcement.5 4 The
reasoning was similar to that of the Board's dissent. The three-judge panel
noted the similarity between the facts in Dow Chemical and Justice Harlan's
hypothetical. The court agreed that the position taken by Justice Harlan and
the majority of the Board was persuasive, but held that that position had,
nonetheless, been explicitly rejected by the Tree Fruits majority. 5 By refusing to
distinguish Tree Fruits upon the grounds expressed by the Board, and finding
no other significant difference between Dow Chemical and Tree Fruits, the court
was left with no choice but to follow Tree Fruits and allow the picketing.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but simultaneously vacated the
judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to that court in light of
intervening circumstances.5 6 Although the Court did not elaborate on what
those circumstances were, it undoubtably was referring to the demise of the
local union involved in the dispute.5 7 The District of Columbia Circuit subse-
quently remanded the case to the NLRB which dismissed the proceedings as
moot. 8
VI. The Present Controversy (Safeco)
A. The NLRB Position
The NLRB first dealt with the issue of the neutrality of the land title com-
panies to the primary labor dispute.5 '. It did so by examining four factors: the
degree of common ownership between Safeco and the land title companies, the
extent to which there was actual common control of their day-to-day opera-
tions, the integration of their business operations, and the land title companies'
dependence on Safeco for a substantial portion of their business.6 0 The purpose
of this inquiry was to assay "the factual relationship between the alleged sec-
ondary employer and the primary employer in light of Congressional intent to
protect employers who are unconcerned and not involved in the labor dispute
of the union and the primary employer." 61 Emphasizing that no one factor was
dispositive, the Board determined that all five land title companies were
neutrals, even though their dependence on Safeco for business was
53 211 N.L.R.B. at 653 (Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting).
54 524 F.2d 853 (1975).
55 Id. at 860.
56 429 U.S. 807 (1977).
57 See Comment, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 583 n.34 (1977).
58 229 N.L.R.B. 302 (1977).
59 226 N.L.R.B. 754, 756 (1976).
60 Id. These criteria were first adopted in NLRB v. Steel Fabricators Local 810 (Sid Harve), 460 F.2d 1
(2d Cir. 1972).
61 226 N.L.R.B. at 756.
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significant. 62 The Board found the other factors to be insubstantial. In par-
ticular, the Board noted that the parties had stipulated that no employees were
interchanged between Safeco and the other companies and that Safeco had no
control over the land title companies' labor relations policies. 6 3
Having determined that the land title companies were neutrals, the Board
found the Union's activity to be unlawful under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 64 The
Board maintained that Tree Fruits was inapposite in a case in which the struck
product is the secondary employer's sole product. It found the Safeco case to
more closely resemble Honolulu Typographical, American Bread, and Hoffman v.
Cement Masons Local 337.65 In following these cases, the Board concluded that
the holding in Tree Fruits does not apply when the union appeal necessarily asks
for a total boycott, and that in such instances the union's "consumer appeal
constitutes coercion of neutral employers within the meaning of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.' '66
B. The En Banc Decision
1. The Majority
Judge Robinson's majority opinion began with a review of the Board's
determination of the land title companies' neutrality. Upon finding itself in
substantial agreement with the Board, the majority refused to overturn the
Board's conclusion. 67 The court then addressed the legality of the picketing in
light of that conclusion. Emphasizing the holding of Dow Chemical, which the
Board had dismissed as inapplicable, the court found no significant difference
between the two cases. 68
Consequently, the court reaffirmed the interpretation of Tree Fruits it had
used in Dow Chemical to uphold the lawfulness of the Union's picketing. 69 As to
the effect of the Supreme Court's vacatur of the judgment in Dow Chemical, the
court stated,
We need not ponder whether vacatur of the panel's judgment in Dow Chemical
robbed the accompanying opinion of the precedential force it otherwise would
have commanded. Whatever its status as precedent, it cannot be gainsaid that
the value of its reasoning endures. 70
The majority concluded that the use of an economic impact test as deter-
minative of the legality of the Union's activity was expressly ruled out by the
62 Id. See also note II supra.
63 226 N.L.R.B. at 756.
64 Id. at 757.
65 See note 8 supra. Hoffman involved a situation where the union picketed homes held for sale by a
developer. The primary dispute was between the union and the general contractor who actually built the
homes. The union request not to buy the homes built by the contractor constituted a request for a total
boycott of the developer. While the court conceivably could have held that the picketing was lawful as
directed solely at the struck product, it chose instead to view the union request in light of its inevitable effect
on the neutral developer.
66 226 N.L.R.B. at 757.
67 No. 76-2015 at 10.
68 Id. at 19.
69 Id. at 27. See generally, 524 F.2d 853 (1975).
70 No. 76-2015 at 18 n.62.
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Supreme Court in Tree Fruits, and that barring such a test, there is no signifi-
cant difference between Tree Fruits and the present case. 71 The court stated, in
effect, that it is not the Union's fault that the land title companies chose to deal
exclusively with one underwriter. To attempt to draw a line between lawful
and unlawful consumer picketing purely on the basis of the percentage of the
secondary employer's business dependent upon the struck product would not
only be impossible, it would conflict with congressional and judicial interpreta-
tion of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 72 The court found there to be a clear line of
demarcation between what section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) "leaves unaffected and what it
plainly forbids-the line distinguishing between picketing a secondary
employer merely to 'follow the struck goods,' and picketing designed to result
in a generalized loss of patronage. . . .73
The court closed by defending its position as necessary to avoid a possible con-
frontation with the First Amendment. When legislation otherwise suspect is
fairly susceptible to an interpretation shielding it from constitutional doubt,
federal courts are duty bound to give it that reading .... Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
has before been accused of encroaching upon those hallowed freedoms, and
the Board's nebulous inferred-intent approach to its operation enlivens the
specter of constitutional infirmity. Here, no less than in Tree Fruits, the call to
sidestep uncertainty of that sort is imperative. 74
2. Judge Robb's Dissent
Although agreeing with both the Board and the majority opinion that the
land title companies were neutrals in the dispute between the Union and
Safeco, Judge Robb insisted that Tree Fruits is inapposite where the struck
product constitutes the great bulk of the neutral's business. The dissent sup-
ported its conclusion by comparing the Union's request to boycott Safeco in-
surance to the request in Honolulu Typographical that customers boycott the
restaurants which advertised in the Honolulu paper. 75 In essence, Judge Robb
viewed the Union as having requested a total boycott while the majority viewed
the same request as one merely following the struck product.
The majority argues in this case that, regardless of the intended or foreseeable
effect of its picketing on the land title companies, the picketing is lawful under
the holding in Tree Fruits because it followed the struck product, Safeco in-
surance. The Court in Tree Fruits, however, repeatedly stressed that section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) proscribes picketing which is intended to persuade the customers
of a secondary employer to cease dealing with him. And the Board has found
here that the Local was seeking a "virtual boycott of the land title
71 Id. at 28-29. "As we read Tree Fruits, Congress has weighed the policies competing for dominance in
the situation at hand, and has cast its lot in favor of picketing designed only to reduce the secondary
employer's market for products of the primary employer. Our charge as judges is to remain faithful to that
understanding." Id.
72 Id. at 26-27. "In urging that the foreseeable economic consequences of the Union's effort converted
an appeal directed solely to the struck product into a prohibited call for a full boycott of the secondary
employer's business, the Board and the dissent alike embrace the concept of coercion that the Tree Fruits con-
signed to the graveyard. More than that, they stand the decisional rationale of Tree Fruits on its head." Id.
73 Id. at 22.
74 Id. at 29.
75 No. 76-2015 at 5 (Robb, J., dissenting).
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companies." Thus, the legislative history recounted by the Court in its Tree
Fruits opinion amply demonstrates that the Local's conduct was one of the
"isolated evils" at which the section was directed. 76
In concluding, the dissent asserted that the Board's resolution of the con-
flicting claims represented a defensible construction of the statute. The Board's
interpretation had, in fact, been followed by every other circuit court that had
addressed the issue 7 7 and was, therefore, entitled to considerable deference. 78
VII. Analysis
At present, any attempt to deal with section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) must inevitably
hinge upon some interpretation of the Supreme Court's holding in Tree Fruits.
Whether the goal is to constrict as narrowly as possible the union's right to
engage in secondary activity or to allow virtually unlimited product picketing,
consideration must first be given to the Supreme Court's sole pronouncement
on that issue. Judge Robinson may have summed up the problem best in his
preface to the present case:
We approach the problem confronting us with full appreciation of its perplexi-
ty. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is ambiguous on the point at issue; and the Supreme
Court's Tree Fruits interpretation of the statutory language, of course, was not
an undertaking to deal with every question that conceivably could arise. We
would be less than frank if we failed to acknowledge that a good many passages
in Tree Fruits can be read in isolation to lend support to either side of the pres-
ent controversy. Our decision, then, is only what it can be: our very best judg-
ment, guided maximally by Tree Fruits considered as a whole, as to what Con-
gress had in mind.7 9
Adding to the confusion is the fact that the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals is the lone court which has refused to distinguish Tree Fruits when the
struck product comprises the great bulk of the neutral employer's business.80
The NLRB has held that in such instances Tree Fruits is inapposite. 8 1 The
Ninth Circuit in Hoffman v. Cement Masons Local 337 also circumvented Tree
Fruits when to do otherwise would have allowed a union to request a virtual
boycott of the neutral employer. 82 Thus, the current status of consumer
picketing under such circumstances is uncertain.
Further clarification of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is needed to assure uniform
enforcement of its provisions. Such clarification should soon be forthcoming
because this case provides an opportunity for the Supreme Court to remedy the
confusion surrounding Tree Fruits. On January 8, 1980 the Supreme Court ac-
cepted the Safeco controversy for review.8 3
There are a variety of options available to the Court in facing the issues
brought forth for review in Safeco. One possibility would be for the Court to
76 Id. at 3.
77 Id. at 5 n.2.
78 Id. at 7.
79 No. 76-2015 at 18.
80 See note 77 supra.
81 226 N.L.R.B. at 757 n.15.
82 See note 65 supra.
83 Cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3425 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1980) (No. 79-672).
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adopt the reasoning of the NLRB and make use of some form of economic im-
pact test. This appears to be the least likely alternative. In Tree Fruits, both the
majority and dissenting opinions expressly rejected an economic impact test. It
has been suggested, however, that the Tree Fruits rejection of an economic im-
pact test was narrow in scope, and leaves open the possibility of devising some
standard which would leave the holding in Tree Fruits untouched while pro-
hibiting the inequitable result of Dow Chemical and Safeco. 84 This approach
would focus on the significance of the product being picketed to the neutral and
hinge upon a determination of whether that product was economically essential
to the neutral employer.
A more likely alternative and one involving the slightest departure from
Tree Fruits would be to focus on the relation of the union's request to the struck
product. Consumer picketing which is confined to the struck product would
clearly be lawful regardless of the economic impact of the picketing on the
neutral employer. This approach is substantially the position of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. 85 This position would provide the needed
clarification of Tree Fruits, enabling a uniform application of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by the courts and the NLRB. Although it would not eliminate the
need for the merged- product exception, this position would provide clearer
boundaries than now exist for application of that doctrine. Most importantly,
this stance would strike a balance between the rights of unions to publicize their
disputes and the rights of neutrals to be protected from the adverse effects of
picketing directed at more than the struck product. This stance is balanced
heavily in favor of the union. It would uphold picketing in situations similar to
Dow Chemical and Safeco. It would, however, be a workable, unambiguous posi-
tion for the Court to take.
Finally, the Court could completely depart from its decision in Tree Fruits
and declare all consumer picketing to be unlawful. As mentioned earlier, sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), prior to Tree Fruits, had been interpreted by a number of
legal commentators to suggest such a result.8 6 In order for such a decision to be
reached, however, the Court will inevitably have to contend with the first
amendment issue originally raised by the late Justice Black in his concurring
opinion in Tree Fruits. 87 Arguing that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was indeed intended
to ban all consumer picketing at a neutral site, Justice Black was convinced that
such a prohibition violated the first amendment.8 8 The first amendment issue
in picketing is still very much an open question.8 9 Concern over that issue un-
doubtedly affected the decision in the present controversy. "We believe also
that our construction of section 8(b)(4)(ii) is necessary to avoid a possible con-
frontation with the First Amendment." 90 In light of the developing limitations
on the first amendment with regard to product picketing, however, support
84 26 LAB. L.J. 585, 589 (1975).
85 Both Dow Chemical and Safeco stand as glaring examples of the inequitable results which that position
would uphold as lawful.
86 See note 26 supra.
87 377 U.S. 58, 76 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
88 Id.
89 See Etelson, Picketing and Freedom of Speech: Comes the Evolution, 10J. MAR. J. PRAC. PRO. 1 (1976-77);
Note, First Amendment Analysis of Peaceful Picketing, 28 ME. L. REv. 203 (1976); Comment, The Secondary
Boycott Provisions of the NLRA and the Tree Fruits and Dow Cases, 7 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 645 (1976).
90 No. 76-2015 at 29.
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can be found for such a departure by the Court. One such example of a recent
limitation can be found in Hudgens v. NLRB, 91 which overruled Food Employees
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. 92 Hudgens involved a situation where a union sought
to picket a retail store in a shopping center. The Court, in denying the union's
right to picket, dealt extensively with the first amendment issue and retreated
significantly from their previous decision in Logan Valley. The Court's holding
emphasized that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only
against abridgment by the government, and not against abridgment by private
persons. 93 That holding by no means eliminates the first amendment issue in
the Safeco controversy, but it does suggest the possibility that the Supreme
Court may well be prepared to go even further in limiting application of the
first amendment to secondary picketing. It has been argued that the Supreme
Court must limit the application of the first amendment if the two-pronged in-
tention of Congress in passing section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is to be followed. 94 That is,
the protection of the neutral business is to be balanced against, not subjugated
to, the right of the labor union to publicize its labor disputes. When the very
existence of the neutral is threatened by the actions of a union in picketing the
neutral, the balance must clearly be struck in favor of the neutral employer.
Therefore, it is possible that in the present case the Court will hold that a
nondiscriminatory proscription against all consumer picketing would not un-
constitutionally abridge the first amendment rights of unions. A number of
benefits would result from a holding to that effect.
Such a holding would provide lower courts and the NLRB with the need-
ed clarification to enforce uniformly section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). It would also further
the unquestioned intent of Congress to protect neutral employers from coercive
interference with their businesses. The publicity proviso of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) which allows "publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public . . . 95 leaves the union a number of adequate
alternative methods for publicizing their disputes with primary employers.
Finally, it would eliminate the need for lower courts to strain the merged prod-
uct doctrine to include cases further removed from the initial situations envi-
sioned as falling within that exception. Such a strain has become increasingly
evident as lower courts deal with the problem of avoiding a clearly inequitable
result while nominally following the guidelines of the Supreme Court. 96 As a
broad ban on consumer picketing would encompass the merged product line of
cases, the need for resort to that doctrine would lapse.
91 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Noted in: Freedom of Speech: Property Rights Triumphant in the Shopping Center, 28 U.
FLA. L. REv. 1032 (1975-76); Hudgens v. NLRB-A Final Definition of the Public Forum?, 13 WAxE FOREST L.
REv. 139 (1977).
92 391 U.S. 308 (1968). Logan Valley is discussed at length in both of the Notes cited at note 91 supra.
93 424 U.S. at 513.
94 Note, supra note 89, at 220.
95 See note I supra.
96 See NLRB v. Salem Building Trades Council, 388 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1968), enforcing, 163 N.L.R.B.
33 (1967); NLRB v. Local 254, Building Service Employees Int. Union, 359 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1966). In the
former case the union was picketing an ice cream store which had been built by an employer with whom the
union was involved in a primary dispute. Rather than deal with the effect of the picketing on the neutral, the
court outlawed the picketing upon the theory that the "goods" struck had become merged with the general
business of the ice cream store. In the latter case there was no product involved at all, the union was one
whose members provided janitorial services. The use of the merged product theory was difficult to under-
stand.
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VIII. Conclusion
The Safeco controversy is an important addition to the case law evolving
from section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). It highlights the inability of the courts to come to a
uniform interpretation of congressional intent in enacting section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B), and the inadequacy of Tree Fruits as a guide for resolving disputes
in this area. Furthermore, it serves the purpose of resurrecting the almost iden-
tical situation which Dow Chemical first brought forward for review. Finally, as
a result of the majority opinion's declaration that the first amendment is un-
doubtedly at issue in a case of this nature, the Supreme Court will almost cer-
tainly have to face that contention directly. The Supreme Court should face
that issue directly. The Court should provide the needed clarification of its
holding in Tree Fruits that is necessary to enforce properly section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
The Court should do so in a manner that will leave no doubt as to the
unlawfulness of consumer picketing when that picketing is directed at the sole
product of a secondary employer who is helpless to resolve the dispute, and
who is in every sense of the phrase being "threatened and coerced" by the
union's act.
Joseph M. Musilek
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